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Analyzing the Labor Market Outcomes of
Occupational Licensing*
MAURY GITTLEMAN, MARK A. KLEE, and
MORRIS M. KLEINER
Recent assessments of occupational licensing have shown varying effects of the insti-
tution on labor-market outcomes. This study revisits the relationship between occupa-
tional licensing and labor-market outcomes by analyzing a new topical module to the
Survey of Income and Program Participation. Relative to previously available data,
the topical module offers more detailed information on occupational licensing attain-
ment, with larger sample sizes and access to richer sets of person-level characteristics.
We find that those with a license earn higher pay, are more likely to be employed,
and have a higher probability of employer-sponsored health insurance offers.
Introduction
There are often disagreements in economics over the appropriate role of
governmental regulation of occupations (Kleiner 2000; Smith 1937). Neoclas-
sical economists have viewed occupational licensing as a form of rent-seeking
(Friedman 1962; Friedman and Kuznets 1945). More recently, theory has sug-
gested occupational licensing provides incentives for workers to enhance their
human capital through greater investments in their work life by limiting low-
skilled substitutes who claim to be able to do the work but have not passed
tests or shown an ability to do the required tasks (Shapiro 1986).
As an empirical issue, occupational licensing has become an increasingly
important factor in the regulation of services in the United States. The number
*The authors’ affiliations are, respectively, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, DC. E-mail:
gittleman_m@bls.gov; Census Bureau, Washington, DC. E-mail: mark.a.klee@census.gov; and University of
Minnesota, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and National Bureau of Economic Research. E-mail:
kleiner@umn.edu. The authors thank Sharon Boivin for her efforts to include questions on certification and
licensing on national databases. This paper benefited from the comments of anonymous referees and from
discussions with Priyanka Anand, Stephanie Ewert, Hwikwon Ham, Hubert Janicki, Jeremy Skog, and Vic-
toria Udalova. The authors also thank seminar participants at the American Economic Association annual
meetings, Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management annual meetings, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, the Census Bureau, College of William and Mary, and the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
for their helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those
of the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, any other agency of the U.S. Department of Labor,
or the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Vol. 57, No. 1 (January 2018). © 2017 Regents of the University of California
Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington
Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK.
57
of occupations that require a license from government has grown since the
1970s, and the percentage licensed has been increasing as well (Greene 1969;
Kleiner 2006). The number of studies analyzing the labor-market institution of
occupational regulation, however, has not been growing proportionately.
One of the largest barriers standing in the way of analyzing occupational
licensing has been that there was no well-organized national dataset available
for the examination of the influence of attaining an occupational license on
wages. New data to address important licensing issues have, however, recently
become available. Specifically, we analyze the 2008 panel of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This panel is a large, nationally rep-
resentative dataset covering the period May 2008 through November 2013.
This was the first time a large government survey specifically asked questions
about licensing and certification attainment.1
In two studies examining the influence of occupational licensing attainment
on wage determination, Kleiner and Krueger (2010, 2013) used special small
survey databases to estimate the effect of occupational licensing on hourly
wage determination in 2006 and 2008. Initially, our estimates use the new lar-
ger governmental survey data from the SIPP to determine wage returns to
licensing; however, we make a number of additional contributions to the litera-
ture. We examine whether there are heterogeneous wage effects by the educa-
tion level of the license holder’s occupation. More importantly, we move
beyond just wage determination to consider other labor-market outcomes. We
assess the impact of licensing on the incidence of key nonwage benefits, and
are the first to consider its effect on the generosity of a benefit (employer-pro-
vided health care). Moreover, ours is the first micro-level analysis to assess the
influence of licensing on the likelihood of being employed.
Our empirical analysis finds that after controlling for observable heterogene-
ity, including occupational status, those with a license earn higher pay, are
more likely to be employed, and have a higher probability of receiving
employer-sponsored health insurance offers. According to our estimates, where
a government-issued license is required for the job, such a credential raises
hourly wages by about 7.5 percent. In addition, in contrast to labor unions,
licensing does not appear to reduce wage inequality, overall, and may, in fact,
increase it in the bottom quartile. The main implications of our results are that
occupational regulation appears to raise the wages and benefits of government-
licensed workers and to provide greater opportunities for employment for
workers who attain a governmental license or certificate.
1 Beginning January 2015, the Current Population Survey (CPS) included three questions on certification
and licensing. The data collected in 2015 from two of those questions were made available for public use
beginning in April 2016.
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Rationale for Our Study
In January 2015, the Bureau of Labor Statistics began to ask a portion of
the sample of the Current Population Survey (CPS) about certification and
licensing (Allard 2016). However, the module on this topic in the SIPP is
more detailed than the three questions in the CPS, and we think that the use
of the SIPP allows for an examination of a wider range of labor-market out-
comes than would be the case by examining only the CPS. Although occupa-
tional associations, such as the American Bar Association and the American
Dental Association, collected wage and salary data, as well as the number of
new entrants and pass rates by state through the early 1980s, the state pass rate
information is no longer tabulated or released to the public. Moreover, state
licensing boards either do not have reliable data to provide to researchers or, if
they do, they are often reluctant to provide it.
Consequently, because estimates about the potential costs and benefits of
licensing are difficult to obtain, our ability to use these new data should
advance knowledge about the labor market effects of certification and licens-
ing. For the most part, economists interested in studying occupational licensing
have needed to find ways to pull together their own data and approaches (Klei-
ner and Krueger 2010, 2013). An example of one approach is examining why
states or countries have different occupational licensing requirements. Why
does Iowa license more than twice as many workers as Indiana (Kleiner and
Vorotnikov 2017)? Is occupational licensing endogenous to the industrial,
occupational, demographic, or political composition of a state? Empirical work
in political economy suggests that political influence and funding of licensing
initiatives by the professions are the most important factors influencing
whether an occupation becomes regulated by the states (Graddy 1991; Whee-
lan 1999).
Another approach to examining licensing might be to find ways to examine
the actual skill levels of certain occupations. Although regulated occupations
routinely require license holders to attend continuing education seminars,
examinations on the contents are rarely given to the persons that attend, and
denial of permission to work in the occupations once an individual passes the
initial licensing exam is highly unusual. Finally, in thinking about the policy
implications of empirical research in this area, it is important to keep in mind
the policy option of certification. This potential substitute for licensing allows
consumers or employers to choose whether they are willing to pay a higher
wage for someone with greater state- or private-documented skills. It is plausi-
ble to think that certification would have lesser effects on labor-market out-
comes within an occupation, because it would not restrict supply as tightly,
and also that it would have lesser effects on quality. Thus, certification offers
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an intermediate choice between the extremes of no state or private role in
qualifications at all and the absolute requirement of having a license before
working at certain occupations. Our study also examines the influence of certi-
fication.
Prior to 2006, the data available on occupational licensing in the United
States were restricted to classifications as to whether various occupations were
licensed at the state level, often based on the America’s Career InfoNet data
(Kleiner and Krueger 2010, 2013). These classifications could be linked to
Census Bureau occupational employment data to derive estimates of the pro-
portion of workers in licensed jobs. Although informative, such data have clear
limitations. First, compliance with state licensing requirements could be less
than complete; some of those classified as working in licensed occupations
may not in fact be licensed. Moreover, many of the workers may be covered
by occupational licensing statutes but not have attained a license (Gittleman
and Kleiner 2016). Second, some occupations have a trial period during which
workers can perform a job before becoming licensed. For example, accoun-
tants may work in an accounting firm prior to obtaining their license. Third,
and probably most important, the state data miss licensing that takes place at
the local and federal level. Kleiner and Krueger (2013) reported that restricting
analysis to state licensing would miss 10.5 percent of licensed workers, and
that 49.8 percent of licensed workers have a credential that was issued by the
state in addition to some other jurisdiction.
As employment in the United States shifted from manufacturing to service
industries, the members of the occupations established a formal set of stan-
dards that governed members of the occupation. Wheelan (1999) argued that,
for a professional association, obtaining licensing legislation meant raising
funds from members to lobby the state legislature, particularly the chairs of
appropriate legislative committees. In addition, the occupation association
often solicits volunteers from its membership to work on legislative cam-
paigns. With both financial contributions and volunteers, the occupational
association has a significant ability to influence legislation and its administra-
tion, especially when opposition to regulatory legislation is absent or minimal.
Occupational regulation refers to mechanisms to impose minimum standards
(often educational standards) for entry and for the ability to continue working
in an occupation. These regulations range from less restrictive (e.g., require-
ments to register their names, addresses, and qualifications with a government
agency), having an exclusive right to a title, known as certification, to very
restrictive (e.g., licensure, where it is illegal to practice an occupation for pay
without meeting government standards). We are able to examine these con-
cepts with the data we use from the SIPP.
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We contrast the results from the SIPP with those obtained from the Prince-
ton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII) (Kleiner and Krueger 2013).2 The PDII
used the results of a telephone survey of the workforce conducted by Westat
that asked detailed questions on occupational regulation as well as questions
on the labor-market status of individuals in 2008. These questions probe the
kind of government regulation required to perform a job, the process of
becoming licensed, and the level of education and tests necessary to become
licensed. The results of the Westat survey, as well as separate validation
results from a related Gallup survey, indicate that occupational licensing can
be reasonably well measured in labor-force surveys. However, the small sam-
ple of slightly more than 2200 individuals and the resulting lack of representa-
tiveness for some groups may bias some of those results. We expect that using
the SIPP with its larger sample size and more detailed set of labor-market
questions will further our analysis of the role of occupational licensing in the
labor market. We next, however, provide a background for our empirical
results by examining the rationale for occupational regulation within different
institutional frameworks.
Theories of Occupational Licensing
Here we review the evolution of theories of occupational licensing, ranging
from the mechanistic ones to those that utilize human capital theory. We begin
by outlining the simplest theory of occupational licensing, which draws more
heavily on administrative procedures than on economics. We then incorporate
insights from more complex theoretical models that challenge some of the
straightforward assumptions of the simple theory and which thereby provide
richer insights into the operation and effects of regulation.
A simple theory of occupational licensing envisions a costless supply of
unbiased, capable gatekeepers and enforcers. The gatekeepers screen entrants
to the occupation, barring those whose skills or character suggest a tendency
toward low-quality output. The enforcers monitor incumbents and discipline
those whose performance is below standard with punishments that may include
revocation of the license needed to practice. Assuming that entry and perfor-
mance are controlled in these ways, the quality of service in the profession
2 We devote considerable attention to Kleiner and Krueger (2013) because of its similarity to our
approach in estimating returns to licensing using an economywide sample. We would be remiss, however, if
we did not mention the literature that seeks to estimate a causal effect of licensing on wages by focusing on
specific occupations. Exemplars of this approach include Kleiner and Kudrle (2000); Law and Marks
(2013); Thornton and Timmons (2013); Timmons and Thornton (2008); and Kleiner et al. (2016).
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will almost automatically be maintained at or above standards that are set by
the gatekeeper to the profession. Within this approach, only those who have
the funds to invest in training and the ability to do the work are able to enter
the occupation.
We introduce economics to this otherwise mechanical model by noting that a
key discipline on incumbents—the threat of revoking one’s license—may not
mean much if incumbents can easily reenter the profession, such as by moving to
a new firm, or by shifting to an alternative occupation with little loss of income.
Since grandfathering (i.e., allowing current workers to bypass the new require-
ments) is the norm when occupations seek to become licensed, incumbent work-
ers are usually supportive of the regulation process. In the absence of
grandfathering, lower skilled workers in the occupation may have to seek alterna-
tive employment. For example, if sales skills are the key to both providing
licensed sales of heart monitors and the unlicensed selling of shoes or cars, then
individuals may shift between these lines of work with little loss of income.
Under these circumstances, meaningful discipline for license holders may
require deliberate steps to ensure that the loss of license entails significant finan-
cial loss. Such additional steps could include imposition of fines, improved
screening to prevent expelled practitioners from reentering the occupation, or
requiring all incumbents to put up capital that would be forfeited upon loss of the
license. To offset the possibility that incumbents could shift to other occupations
with little loss of income, entry requirements could be tightened to limit supply
and create monopoly rents within the licensed occupation. The threat of losing
these monopoly rents could, in principle, give incentives to incumbents to main-
tain quality standards. This may also result in some increases in human capital
investments in order to attain the additional requirements. The rents could also
motivate potential entrants to invest in high levels of training in order to gain
admittance. This suggests that licensing can raise quality within an industry by
restricting supply, thereby raising labor wages.
State-regulated occupations can use political institutions to restrict supply
and raise the wages of licensed practitioners. There is assumed to be a once-
and-for-all income gain that accrues to current members of the occupation who
are grandfathered in and do not have to meet the newly established standard
(Perloff 1980). Generally, workers who are grandfathered in are not required
to ever meet the standards of the new entrants. Individuals who attempt to
enter the occupation in the future will need to balance the economic rents of
the field’s increased monopoly power against the greater difficulty of meeting
the entrance requirements.
Once an occupation is regulated, members of that occupation in a geo-
graphic or political jurisdiction can implement tougher statutes or examination
pass rates and may gain relative to those who have easier requirements by
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further restricting the supply of labor and obtaining economic rents for incum-
bents. Restrictions would include lowering the pass rate on licensing exams,
imposing higher general and specific requirements, and implementing tougher
residency requirements that limit new arrivals in the area from qualifying for a
license. Moreover, individuals who have finished schooling in the occupation
may decide not to go to a particular political jurisdiction where the pass rate is
low because both the economic and shame costs may be high.
One additional effect of licensing is that individuals who are not allowed to
practice at all in an occupation as a consequence of regulation may then enter
an unlicensed occupation, thereby shifting the supply curve outward and driv-
ing down wages in these unregulated occupations. If licensing requirements
contain elements of required general human capital, then these workers may
possibly raise the average skill level in their new occupation.
Data
To analyze a range of labor-market effects of occupational regulation, we
employ data from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Partic-
ipation (SIPP). This panel is a large, nationally representative dataset covering
the period May 2008 through November 2013. Every 4 months, respondents
answer a core group of questions about the preceding 4 months. These
responses provide detailed monthly information about demographics, employ-
ment situations, earnings, and a variety of other characteristics. Respondents
also answer a separate group of topical questions that vary from one interview,
or wave, to the next. We primarily utilize the Professional Certifications,
Licenses, and Educational Certificates topical module linked with Core data
from the thirteenth wave of the 2008 panel, collected between September and
December 2012. In addition, we refer to previous topical modules to the SIPP
in order to estimate the impact of license and certification attainment on non-
wage benefits. Specifically, we exploit the Employer-Provided Health Benefits
topical module in the sixth wave and the Retirement and Pension Plan Cover-
age topical module in the eleventh wave.
Professional Certifications, Licenses, and Educational Certificates topical
module. The Professional Certifications, Licenses, and Educational Certifi-
cates topical module offers data about the most recent license or certification
that a respondent earned (Ewert and Kominski 2014).3 To begin, all
3 The Federal Interagency Working Group on Expanded Measures of Enrollment and Attainment devel-
oped and tested the survey questions that constitute this topical module (Allard 2016; Bielick et al. 2013).
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respondents aged 16 and over answered the question “Do/Does you/he/she
have a professional certification or a state or industry license?”
Responses to this question are of primary interest for our analysis because they
enable us to investigate how labor-market outcomes differ for those who obtain
these credentials. Individuals who had attained a professional certification or
license then answered the question “Who awarded this certification or license?”
Finally, these respondents replied whether the awarding body required three
common minimum standards in order to earn and maintain the credential: tak-
ing courses or training, demonstrating skills while on the job or passing a test
or exam, and taking periodic tests or continuing education classes or earning
CEUs (continuing education units).
Our data bear several important advantages over previous examinations of
these issues for our analysis. First, the topical module contains a direct mea-
sure of credential attainment, which, at the time was not true of any other
large, nationally representative dataset.4 Studies that employ these datasets
infer license attainment from occupational affiliation and, sometimes, state. If
regulations require a license to perform tasks within an occupation, then any
respondent in that occupation is imputed to have achieved a license. Conse-
quently, previous examinations of the labor-market impacts of licensing in
large, nationally representative datasets limit themselves to relatively few insti-
tutional settings, thereby diminishing their external validity.5 A second issue
with this imputation strategy is evidence of substantial measurement error in
occupational affiliation (Kambourov and Manovskii 2008). Measurement error
in occupational affiliation could create measurement error in licensure status.
Kleiner and Krueger (2013) also emphasized the importance of direct mea-
sures of license and certification attainment. In explaining the relative
4 As noted in an earlier footnote, the CPS, as of January 2015, includes three questions on certification
and licensing directed to a portion of the sample, but the data from these questions were not made available
to the public until April 2016.
5 Law and Marks (2009) used the decennial census to document how the introduction of licensing regu-
lations during the Progressive Era affected outcomes in eleven detailed occupations. Kleiner (2006) and Klee
(2013) exploited variation across states and over time in the stringency of licensing regulations to analyze
wage effects for four detailed occupations in the decennial census and CPS, respectively. Kleiner (2000)
compared average earnings across four licensed occupations and similar unlicensed occupations. Kleiner
(2006) presented average wage changes from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, 1979 (NLSY79)
respondents who moved into and out of licensed occupations. One notable exception is Gittleman and Klei-
ner (2016). They constructed a comprehensive list of licensed occupations and categorized each state-by-
occupation pair along two dimensions: whether no, some, or all workers must have a license and how long
this licensing policy has been in effect. They estimated the licensing wage effect using the NLSY79.
Although their regulatory data improve external validity, a direct measure of license attainment would facili-
tate identifying the licensing wage premium in occupations that were only partially licensed. In the absence
of such a direct measure, the authors report a range of wage effects under extreme assumptions about the
fraction of workers in the occupation that has a license and the starting date of the licensing regulation.
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inattention given to these prevalent policies, they claimed “a major reason for
the lack of empirical work has been the absence of national data that clearly
defines whether a worker is regulated and the extent of regulation” (p. S174).
Our data help fill that void. Kleiner and Krueger (2013) found that attaining a
license confers a significant wage premium. This relationship persists when
they attempted to mitigate selection bias by using only within-occupation wage
variation to identify this effect. However, their sample size was relatively
small, about 2200 respondents, with a low response rate compared with gov-
ernment labor force surveys. The SIPP’s large sample size, its second advan-
tage, allows for more externally valid and more precise estimates of the wage
benefits of professional licenses. Increased precision is especially advantageous
when estimating models that include occupation fixed effects.
A third advantage of the SIPP is that the core data include a breadth of infor-
mation about individuals and their labor-market outcomes. This improves our
ability to control for observable heterogeneity that might be correlated with both
attainment and labor-market outcomes.6 The variety of data also expands the
ability to analyze how the attainment of licenses and certifications relates to non-
wage benefits. Most surveys lack information about these forms of compensa-
tion, perhaps explaining why this relationship remains an understudied topic.7
The data also have some limitations for our analysis. First, the Professional
Certifications, Licenses, and Educational Certificates topical module does not
allow us to distinguish as confidently as we would like between respondents
who have earned licenses and respondents who have earned certifications.8
Both credentials signal a worker’s quality to potential employers in markets
6 On average, workers who have attained a license are older, more educated, more likely to belong to a
union, more likely to work for a public employer, and more likely to work in the services sector (Kleiner
and Krueger 2010, 2013). Licenses and certifications are also more common among individuals who are
non-Hispanic white, aged 30 through 49, native born, and employed (Ewert and Kominski 2014).
7 To our knowledge, Gittleman and Kleiner (2016) is the only previous examination of the relationship
between licensing and nonwage benefits, though their analysis, because it used the NLSY79, is cohort-speci-
fic and does not cover the entire prime working age range.
8 It may be noted that this limitation is true for the CPS as well. By contrast, the PDII does distinguish
confidently between licensed and certified workers utilizing the question “Would someone who does not
have a license or certificate be legally allowed to do your job?” The SIPP topical module does include the
following question: “Is this certification or license required for your/his/her current or most recent job?”
Some respondents might have interpreted this question as asking whether the credential was a legal require-
ment. Differences in legal requirements would allow us to distinguish licensed from certified workers. Other
respondents might have interpreted this question as asking whether the credential was an informal require-
ment. Examples of such informal requirements occur when employers require the credential to consider a
job candidate qualified or when completing a task requires some proficiency that only credentialed workers
possess. To the extent that informal requirements and legal requirements do not align, this interpretation
would not allow us to distinguish licensed from certified workers. We lack sufficient information to deter-
mine the relative prevalence of these two interpretations and, consequently, do not use this question to define
licensing status.
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characterized by asymmetric information. The fundamental difference between
a license and a certification is that a licensed worker may not practice by law
without a license, whereas a certified worker may practice by law without a
certification but may not use the title held by those who have the certification.
Our main explanatory variable of interest indicates whether an individual had
attained either a license or a certification. We refer to this classification as “Defi-
nition 1,” and classify individuals as “credentialed” or not. We also use charac-
teristics of respondents’ credentials to construct a classification of licensed and
certified workers. In particular, we assume that a respondent had attained a
license if a federal, state, or local government issued that respondent’s credential
(“licensed”). By contrast, we assume that a respondent had attained a certifica-
tion if a private agency issued that respondent’s credential (“certified”).9 We
refer to this classification as “Definition 2.” This definition assumes that licensing
regulations may require practitioners to obtain only government-issued creden-
tials, and that privately issued credentials may not serve as a legal basis for
restricting the right to practice. Although this assumption is likely invalid for
some occupations, it is generally consistent with the current institutional context
across the United States. One disadvantage of this criterion is that the topical
module only asked respondents about the characteristics of their newest creden-
tial. Therefore, our classification will suffer from measurement error to the extent
that workers obtained both a license and a certification. In addition, some respon-
dents may incorrectly answer that a private entity issued their credentials when
in fact it was a government agency, or vice versa.
A second limitation of our data is that the SIPP collects information on up
to two jobs and up to two businesses, but respondents did not indicate the job
or business for which their credential was relevant.10 We assume that the cre-
dential was relevant only for the job or business in which a respondent earned
the highest hourly wage (derived from monthly earnings, usual weekly hours
worked, and weeks worked) during a particular reference month, which we
refer to as the “main” job or business in that month. We drop all other jobs
and businesses in that month, regardless of a respondent’s licensure or certifi-
cation status. Regression estimates include job- or business-level information
on hourly wages, union status, occupation, broad industry affiliation, establish-
ment size, and employer type.11 These variables will suffer from measurement
9 Private organizations that issue credentials in our data include industries, businesses, companies, non-
profit organizations, professional associations, and other private associations.
10 By contrast, the PDII specifically asked about licenses and certifications that were relevant for respon-
dents’ main job.
11 Monthly earnings include regular hourly pay and salary, tips, overtime, commissions, bonuses, and
cash awards. For business owners, monthly earnings also include profits.
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error to the extent that respondents held credentials that were not relevant for
main jobs or businesses.
Demographics, job- or business-level information, and employment status
come from Core data in the same wave of the SIPP. We also use these Core
data to derive an employer-sponsored health insurance outcome that we
employ to examine the impact of licenses and certifications on nonwage bene-
fits. Specifically, respondents with employer-sponsored health insurance indi-
cate whether their employer paid all, part, or none of that plan’s premium. We
use this question to create a variable that takes a value of 1 for respondents
whose employers paid at least some of the health insurance premium and 0 for
all other respondents who had health insurance through their employer.12 One
problem with this variable is that respondents with multiple jobs or businesses
did not identify which employer sponsored their health insurance plan. Conse-
quently, this variable will suffer from measurement error to the extent that
workers provided information about health insurance obtained through jobs or
businesses for which their licenses and certifications were irrelevant.
Our sample contains respondents aged 18 through 64 who worked in the
civilian labor force. For all analyses, we restrict our sample to individuals who
provided valid data for the dependent variable.13 When we classify a worker’s
licensure or certification status according to Definition 1, we restrict the sample
to respondents who provided valid data about credential attainment. When we
classify a worker’s licensure or certification status according to Definition 2,
we also restrict the sample to respondents who provided valid data about the
source of their credential.14 Finally, in models that include occupation fixed
effects, we restrict the sample to respondents who provided valid data on their
occupational affiliation.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for licensed and certified civilian workers.
Of civilian workers aged 18 through 64, 28.0 percent had attained a license or
certification in the fall of 2012. Sample attrition likely biases this estimate
12 Note that this variable is undefined for respondents with health insurance coverage through a spouse’s
plan only.
13 Because we drop observations with imputed dependent variables, our results are not representative of
the entire U.S. population of civilian workers aged 18 through 64. The Census Bureau does not account for
licensure or certification status in the imputation process. Including observations with imputed dependent
variables without modeling nonresponse would bias estimates toward zero (Hirsch and Schumacher 2004).
Future work should consider more carefully the impact of nonresponse on the estimated wage benefits and
nonwage benefits accruing to licensed and certified workers.
14 Typically, the Census Bureau imputes data for individuals who provided no valid response to a ques-
tion in SIPP. This process fills in missing data for individuals who refused to answer a question, for exam-
ple. However, these invalid responses remain in the Professional Certifications, Licenses, and Educational
Certificates topical module. Item nonresponse rates were relatively small at 2.5 percent for the direct mea-
sure of credential attainment and 1.4 percent for the source of the credential.
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upward. By Wave 13, a considerable portion of initial respondents had exited the
sample.15 Sample attrition was more likely among respondents of the 1990 SIPP
panel who were unemployed or out of the labor force in the previous wave
TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF LICENSED AND CERTIFIED WORKERSa
Variable
Definition 1 Definition 2
Percent
Licensed or
Certified SD N
Percent
Licensed SD
Percent
Certified SD N
Total 28.0 44.9 25,704 19.7 39.8 8.0 27.1 25,602
Gender:
Male 26.1 43.9 13,036 16.8 37.4 8.9 28.5 12,972
Female 30.1 45.9 12,668 23.0 42.1 6.9 25.4 12,630
Education level:
Less than high school 8.4 27.7 1672 5.0 21.8 2.9 16.9 1665
High school 15.3 36.0 6220 9.7 29.6 5.4 22.6 6197
Some college 29.7 45.7 9017 19.9 39.9 9.5 29.4 8970
College (BA) 32.4 46.8 5669 24.1 42.8 8.1 27.2 5655
Postgraduate 49.6 50.0 3126 38.5 48.7 10.9 31.2 3115
Race and Ethnicity:
Whiteb 31.4 46.4 18,011 22.4 41.7 8.7 28.2 17,944
Hispanic 16.8 37.4 2652 11.1 31.4 5.4 22.6 2640
Black 24.7 43.2 2540 17.3 37.9 6.9 25.4 2523
Other 23.3 42.3 2501 15.7 36.4 7.4 26.2 2495
Age:
25 or under 14.5 35.2 3318 9.5 29.3 4.8 21.3 3310
26–54 29.8 45.7 17,443 20.9 40.6 8.7 28.1 17,376
55 or older 31.3 46.4 4943 23.3 42.3 7.7 26.6 4916
Union status:
Union 43.1 49.5 2712 34.6 47.6 8.2 27.5 2698
Nonunion 26.2 43.9 22,298 17.9 38.4 8.0 27.1 22,219
Private or public:
Private company 25.7 43.7 21,549 16.9 37.5 8.5 27.9 21,463
Public 40.8 49.2 3973 35.7 47.9 4.9 21.7 3957
Industryc:
Service-providing 30.2 45.9 20,674 22.0 41.4 7.9 27.0 20,590
Goods-producing 18.7 39.0 4794 10.0 30.0 8.4 27.7 4777
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of at least one
reference month. Summary statistics exclude imputed values and are computed at the person level. The reference period
is May through November 2012.
b
“White,” “Black,” and “Other” categories include both Hispanic and non-Hispanic workers.
cUnion status, public or private employer, and type of work represent characteristics of workers’ main job or business. We
determine the main job in a particular month as the primary source of earnings in that month. Industry represents super-
sector according to industries in the 2000 Census industry classification system.
15 Of the 105,663 respondents who participated in Wave 1 of the SIPP, only 66,034 participated in
Wave 13 of the SIPP. An additional 10,954 Wave 13 respondents entered the sample after Wave 1.
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(Zabel 1998). Respondents who were unemployed or out of the labor force for
each of the previous 4 months were less likely to have attained a license or certi-
fication (Ewert and Kominski 2014).16 Table 1 also presents summary statistics
when we classify licensure and certification status according to Definition 2.
Under this assumption, 19.7 percent of civilian workers aged 18 through 64 had
attained a license, and 8.0 percent of this population had attained a certification.
Credentialed workers are in all twenty-two nonmilitary 2-digit Standard Occu-
pational Classification (SOC) codes, with the proportion of such individuals rang-
ing from 10.5 percent among farming, forestry, and fishing occupations; 11.4
percent in food preparation and serving-related occupations; and 11.8 percent in
production at the bottom to 57.8 percent in education, training, and library occupa-
tions; 58.7 percent in legal occupations; and 79.4 percent in health-care practition-
ers and technical occupations at the top. Even if one examines 3-digit occupations,
credentialed workers are in 393 of 474 occupations or 82.9 percent. At this level,
with estimates more susceptible to both sampling and measurement error, the share
of those credentialed runs the gamut from 0 to 100 percent.
Table 2 describes who issued the credential and how workers achieved the
credential. Among licensed or certified workers, 64.1 percent received their
TABLE 2
REQUIREMENTS FOR BECOMING LICENSED OR CERTIFIEDa
Variable
Definition 1 Definition 2
% of
Licensed or
Certified
Workers Facing
Requirement S.D. N
% of
Licensed
Workers
Facing
Requirement S.D.
% of
Certified
Workers
Facing
Requirement S.D. N
Requirement:
Courses or training 93.0 25.4 7211 93.4 24.8 92.1 26.9 7133
Skills or exam 91.9 27.3 7183 91.9 27.2 91.8 27.4 7111
Continuing education 69.5 46.1 7080 73.4 44.2 60.3 48.9 7019
Level of government:
Federal only 4.8 21.4 7160 6.8 25.1 0 0 7160
State only 64.1 48.0 7160 89.9 30.1 0 0 7160
Local only 2.3 15.1 7160 3.3 17.8 0 0 7160
Private only 28.7 45.3 7160 0 0 1 0 7160
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of at least one
reference month and who report license or certification attainment. Summary statistics exclude imputed values and are
computed at the person level. The reference period is September through December 2012.
16 Beginning with Wave 1 of the 2014 panel, the SIPP offered a direct measure of credential attainment
and information about who issued these credentials. Consequently, it is possible to estimate the percentage
licensed and certified based on a sample that minimizes attrition bias.
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credential from the state. In order to obtain their credential, 93.0 percent of
workers needed to complete courses or training.17,18
Topical modules in earlier waves of 2008 SIPP. As noted, another advan-
tage of our data is the capability to link the Professional Certifications,
Licenses, and Educational Certificates topical module to other topical modules
that accompanied previous waves of the SIPP. This substantially expands the
set of outcomes that we can analyze. For instance, Core SIPP data contain
very little information about access to employer-sponsored retirement and pen-
sion plans.19 To improve upon this information, we utilize data from the
Retirement and Pension Plan Coverage topical module, collected between Jan-
uary and April 2012 in Wave 11 of the SIPP. The availability of previous topi-
cal modules also enables us to expand our estimation sample for some
analyses. Core SIPP data contain information on employer-sponsored health
insurance offers only for respondents who have no coverage. To expand our
17 Appendix Table 1 lists the most common occupations for licensed or certified individuals in our data.
Appendix Table 2 lists the analogous occupations when we classify licensure and certification status accord-
ing to Definition 2. The most commonly regulated occupations in our data are commonly regulated in prac-
tice, which suggests that our data are reliable. Nevertheless, the relatively low percentage of workers in
some universally licensed occupations who report having a credential suggests that the data remain imper-
fect. Consider the 138 individuals whose responses classify them as physicians or surgeons on their main
job or business. Absent measurement error in occupational affiliation, regulations predict that all of these
respondents had obtained a professional license. Of the 138 physicians or surgeons, some 107 reported that
they had attained a license or certification. Of these 107 respondents, Definition 2 would classify 86 as
licensed. All physicians and surgeons in the PDII had attained a license, though that data contained only
fourteen of them. This deviation from predicted attainment in the SIPP data likely reflects measurement error
in attainment data in some cases. However, direct measures of attainment could help us identify measure-
ment error in occupational affiliation in other cases.
18 One potential source of measurement error is proxy response. If a household member is absent at the
interview, the SIPP allows a household member who is present at the interview to answer on behalf of the
absent household member. This form of data collection is known as a proxy interview. Proxy respondents
might have relatively poor knowledge of other household members’ occupations or credential attainment sta-
tus. To gauge the degree to which proxy response explains the deviation from predicted attainment that we
observe in the data, we compared the incidence of proxy response across workers with and without a cre-
dential in various universally licensed occupations. While 43.0 percent of physicians and surgeons with a
license or certification resulted from a proxy response, 32.3 percent of physicians and surgeons with no
license or certification resulted from a proxy response. This evidence seems inconsistent with the hypothesis
that proxy responses play a disproportionate role in explaining the deviation from predicted attainment. We
also found a generally comparable incidence of proxy response among cosmetologists, lawyers, and regis-
tered nurses with a credential and those without a credential
19 In the Core SIPP, there is no direct information on retirement and pension plan offers. We can infer
that respondents who received income from retirement or pension plans must have been offered such a plan.
However, we cannot distinguish those who were not offered a retirement or pension plan from those who
chose not to participate. Moreover, Core SIPP data include no characteristics of the job or business that
sponsored respondents’ plans. Consequently, we cannot infer whether a respondent’s credential was relevant
for this job or business.
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estimation sample, we utilize data from the Employer-Provided Health Benefits
topical module, collected between May and August 2010 in Wave 6 of the
SIPP.
The Retirement and Pension Plan Coverage topical module asked all respon-
dents aged 15 and over who held a job or owned a business as of the end of
the reference period whether their main job or business offered a pension or
retirement plan to anyone.20 If a respondent replied affirmatively, the topical
module then asked whether the respondent participated in one of these plans.
Respondents who did not participate then selected all of the reasons why they
had no coverage. Several of these reasons indicate ineligibility to receive a
retirement or pension plan offer.21 We use these responses to derive a variable
that takes a value of 1 for respondents who participated in or were eligible for
a retirement or pension plan through their main job or business and a value of
0 for all other respondents aged 15 and over who worked in the civilian labor
force at the end of the reference period. We link this variable to licensing and
certification variables from Wave 13 and to demographics and characteristics
of the main job or business from Wave 11 Core SIPP data.
Our expanded measure of employer-sponsored health insurance offers
stems from both Core SIPP and the Employer-Provided Health Benefits
topical module. Core SIPP asked all respondents whether they had health
insurance coverage in their own name or in someone else’s name. Respon-
dents with health insurance then replied whether a current employer spon-
sored this health insurance plan. The topical module asked working
respondents aged 15 and over without health insurance sponsored by their
current employer whether their employer offered health insurance to anyone.
Respondents answering affirmatively then chose the reason why they did
not participate. One of these reasons indicates ineligibility to receive a
health insurance offer. We use these responses to derive a variable that
20 This topical module defines the respondent’s main job or business according to the following algo-
rithm. For respondents who held multiple jobs at the end of the 4-month reference period, the main job is
the one on which the respondent worked the most weeks during the reference period. The topical module
designates the main business using the same criterion for respondents who owned multiple businesses at the
end of the reference period. If a respondent worked an equal number of weeks at two or more jobs, the main
job is the one on which the respondent usually worked the most hours. If a respondent worked an equal
number of weeks at two or more businesses, the main business is the one on which the respondent earned
the most during the reference period. If a respondent held a job and owned a business at the end of the ref-
erence period, the topical module asks about retirement plans associated with the largest earnings source dur-
ing the 4-month reference period.
21 The reasons that indicate ineligibility are: the employer offered no plan to anyone in the respondent’s
type of job, the respondent was not working at the job long enough to qualify, the respondent was too old
or too young to qualify, and the respondent was ineligible by virtue of being a part-time or temporary
employee.
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takes a value of 1 for respondents who participated in or were eligible for
an employer-provided health insurance plan and a value of 0 for all other
respondents aged 15 and over who worked in the civilian labor force at
the end of the reference period. We link this variable to the licensing and
certification variables from Wave 13 and to demographics and characteris-
tics of jobs or businesses from Wave 6 Core SIPP data.
Although these previous topical modules afford the benefit of expanding
the set of labor-market outcomes that we can examine, one key obstacle
impedes our use of these data. Specifically, the Professional Certifications,
Licenses, and Educational Certificates topical module does not offer data
regarding when respondents attained their credentials. Consequently, we can
observe licensure and certification status as of September through December
2012, but this information is unobservable as of January through April
2012 and May through August 2010. One potential solution is to assume
that workers’ licensure and certification status remained unchanged across
all three reference periods. This assumption seems more likely to hold for
the reference period January through April 2012 than for May through
August 2010. Under this assumption, our primary explanatory variable of
interest would suffer from measurement error to the extent that respondents
attained credentials or allowed credentials to lapse between these three ref-
erence periods.
We pursue an alternative solution that restricts the estimation sample, likely
resulting in less measurement error but also diminished external validity. In
particular, we assume that a worker’s licensure and certification status in Wave
13 matched that worker’s status in a previous wave if the respondent’s “main”
occupational spell in Wave 13 was ongoing in that preceding wave. Workers
in a licensed occupation may not practice by law without the credential, so
workers whose licenses lapse likely change occupations. Similarly, employers
might view a certification as a signal of a worker’s quality, so workers whose
certifications lapse may be more likely to change occupations. Thus, we
restrict our sample to include only those workers whose main occupational
spell in Wave 13 was ongoing in the relevant previous wave. For the Retire-
ment and Pension Plan Coverage topical module, we further require that a
worker’s occupation on the main job or business was the same in Wave 13
and Wave 11. Note that the Employer-Provided Health Benefits topical module
collects information about benefits on any job or business. Consequently, our
indicator variable for health insurance offers will suffer from measurement
error to the extent that workers provide information about health insurance
plans on jobs or businesses for which their licenses and certifications were
irrelevant.
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Empirical Approach
Before turning to our results, we briefly sketch the empirical approach that
we take. The main goal of this study is to assess the impact of holding a
license on important labor-market outcomes. The first question we will address
is whether those obtaining a license earn a wage premium. To do so, we will
estimate regressions of the following form:
InWagemi ¼ b0 þ b1Licensei þ b2Xi þ b3Zmi þ emi; ð1Þ
where the dependent variable, InWagemi, is the log of hourly wages in month
m for individual i, Licensei indicates whether individual i holds a license (un-
der Definition 1 or Definition 2), Xi is a vector of independent variables that
does not vary by month, Zmi is a vector of explanatory variables that does vary
by month, and ɛmi is the error term.
Besides hourly wages, as noted, we are also interested in assessing the
impact of licensing status on other outcomes, including the probability of
employment, of being offered employer-sponsored health insurance, and of
being offered a retirement plan. Representing these 1–0 outcomes as Yi, we
estimate regressions of the following form:
Ymi ¼ b0 þ b1Licensei þ b2Xi þ b3Zmi þ emi: ð2Þ
If ɛmi is drawn from a normal distribution, then equation (2) implies a pro-
bit. Regardless of whether we are estimating a wage regression or a regression
for a limited dependent variable, sample weights are used, and standard errors
are estimated via balanced repeated replication (BRR) in order to take into
account the complex survey design of the SIPP.
One must be cautious about interpreting the coefficient b1 as causal, given
that those with a license may differ from those without a license in ways
unobserved by the econometrician. With our cross-sectional data, we control
for observable heterogeneity within the limits of the data. For each of our out-
comes, we estimate specifications with no occupation controls, with 2-digit
occupation fixed effects and then with 3-digit occupation fixed effects. In these
cases, identification is coming from within-occupation comparisons, which
may be across states with different licensing requirements or within a state
between those who have attained a license and those who have not. It should
also be noted that to the degree there is measurement error in determining
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licensing status, the coefficient on licensing will be biased toward zero.22
Although the SIPP module likely has less measurement error in licensing sta-
tus than would be the case if we imputed licensing status on the basis of regu-
lations, we have noted anomalies that suggest the presence of measurement
error nonetheless.
While an instrumental variables strategy is often used in cases when the
aforementioned econometric issues—unobserved heterogeneity and measure-
ment error—are present, such an approach will not be used here for two rea-
sons. First, especially when one is considering economy-wide licensing, it is
difficult to come up with appropriate instruments (Kleiner and Krueger 2013).
Second, instrumental variables (IV) estimation is upwardly biased when the
mismeasured variable is binary, because measurement error in such a case
must be correlated with the true value (Frazis and Loewenstein 2003).
Results
In this section, we assess the benefits accruing to workers with a profes-
sional license or certification. We first report the wage gains associated with
these credentials. We then examine whether the source of a credential or the
requirements to earn or maintain a credential matter for wages. Next, we con-
sider the nonwage benefits of license and certification attainment. We study
these effects both in Wave 13 Core data and in data from previous topical
modules. After documenting the average impact of professional licenses and
certifications on wages and nonwage benefits, we close by analyzing the distri-
butional effects of these credentials.
Wages. We begin in Tables 3 through 7 by performing a wage analysis
similar to that in Kleiner and Krueger (2013). We restrict the sample to per-
son-month observations from respondents who were employed in the civilian
labor force at the end of the month. We include only observations from
respondents who provided valid data on union status and whose implied
hourly wages fell between $5 and $100. Kleiner and Krueger (2013) employed
sample selection criteria that differ from ours along two dimensions: they set a
22 To gauge an aspect of this attenuation bias, we estimate average wage differentials across workers
with and without a credential in various universally licensed occupations. Physicians and surgeons without a
license or certification do not earn significantly less than physicians and surgeons with a license or certifica-
tion, although this coefficient was estimated relatively imprecisely (standard error 16.6 percent). However,
registered nurses without a license or certification earn 24.7 percent (standard error 8.3 percent) lower wages
than registered nurses with a license or certification after controlling for observable characteristics. We find
qualitatively similar results when we classify license attainment status according to Definition 2.
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different standard for outliers in the upper tail of the hourly wage distribution,
and they allowed for almost no imputed data. Although the estimation sample
in Kleiner and Krueger (2013) contains only one wage observation per respon-
dent, our sample contains up to four. We also control for the same set of
observables to the extent possible; our explanatory variables do not include
measures of math and reading skills, we replace a quadratic in work experi-
ence with a quadratic in age, and we create a service worker indicator variable
based on industry codes. Finally, we assume that a worker’s licensure and cer-
tification status remained unchanged over the reference period of May through
November 2012.
TABLE 3
EFFECT OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION ON WAGESa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Definition 1
Licensed or certifiedb 0.236*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.065*** 0.057***
(0.010)c (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
R2 0.033 0.340 0.441 0.514 0.509
N 77,294 75,793 75,605 75,605 66,984
Panel B: Definition 2
Licensed 0.217*** 0.061*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.038***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
R2 0.022 0.338 0.440 0.513 0.508
N 77,059 75,562 75,374 75,374 66,786
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of a reference
month with implied hourly wages on the main job between $5 and $100. Regressions exclude person-month observations
with imputed implied hourly wage, licensure status, and union status. Regressions in columns (3), (4), and (5) also
exclude observations with imputed occupation. Regression in column (5) also excludes observations for which all practi-
tioners in the reported occupation must attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the full list of universally licensed
occupations. The reference period is May through November 2012.
bThe estimates in this table result from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. The dependent variable is hourly wage on
the main job as implied by monthly earnings and profits, weeks worked at the main job in that month, and usual weekly
hours worked on the main job. We determine the main job in a particular month as the primary source of earnings in that
month. Other controls in columns (2)–(5) include a quadratic in age, years of education, union status, a government
worker indicator, a service worker indicator, a self-employed indicator, a female indicator, a Hispanic indicator, a black
indicator, an Asian indicator, and region fixed effects. Union status, government worker, service worker, self-employed
worker, and occupation represent characteristics of workers’ main job or business. Column (3) uses 2-digit occupational
affiliation and columns (4) and (5) use 3-digit occupational affiliation according to the 2000 Census occupational classifi-
cation system.
cWe employed 160 balanced repeated replicate weights using a Fay’s adjustment factor of 0.5 to estimate the standard
errors listed in parentheses. Standard errors take into account multiple observations at person level.
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First, we estimate the impact of professional license and certification attain-
ment on wages.23 Panel A of Table 3 presents the results of regressions that
do not distinguish between licensed and certified workers.24 Column (1) illus-
trates that credentialed workers earn approximately 23.6 percent higher wages
on average.25 Columns (2) through (4) document that, once we account for
observable heterogeneity, the wage premium associated with these credentials
falls. Estimates in column (4) suggest that credentialed workers earn approxi-
mately 6.5 percent (standard error 0.9 percent) higher wages on average con-
trolling for detailed occupation. By comparison, union workers earn
approximately 18.2 percent (standard error 1.1 percent) higher wages on aver-
age than nonunion workers after accounting for observable heterogeneity
including detailed occupation. Gittleman and Kleiner (2016) also concluded
that the union wage effect outstrips the licensing wage effect.
The estimates in column (4) exploit only wage variation within 3-digit occu-
pations to identify the effect of a credential, thereby mitigating potential selec-
tion bias. This strategy yields a comparable interpretation of the estimated
wage premium relative to the corresponding estimate in existing studies that
focus on a more limited set of occupations. Since our identification strategy
relies on variation in credential attainment within 3-digit occupations, we do
not interpret the estimate of 6.5 percent as the wage premium accruing to all
credentialed individuals.26 In the absence of measurement error, wage variation
within universally licensed 3-digit occupations would not contribute to the
identification of our preferred estimate of the effect of a credential. As some
23 The dependent variable is hourly wage on the main job or business implied by monthly earnings,
usual weekly hours worked, and number of weeks worked during that month.
24 Unless otherwise stated, all comparisons in the text are significant at the 90-percent level. The estimates
discussed here are based on responses from a sample of the population and may differ from the actual values
because of sampling variability and other factors. For information on sampling and nonsampling error, see
United States Census Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation, “Source and Accuracy State-
ments,” http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sipp/tech-documentation/source-accuracy-statements.html.
25 Throughout, as an approximation, we equate log points with percentage differences.
26 Note that the variation in credential attainment that we exploit in this paper may be either within-state
variation or across-state variation. We also estimated the regressions in Tables 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, and 12 includ-
ing state fixed effects to exploit only within-state variation in credential attainment. No coefficient estimate
changed in sign. Only three coefficient estimates changed in statistical significance. After controlling for
observables including detailed occupation and before dropping universally licensed occupations, certified
individuals were no more likely to be employed than unlicensed and uncertified individuals (see Panel B of
Table 9). After controlling for observables including detailed occupation and before dropping universally
licensed occupations, credentialed workers were no more likely than uncredentialed workers to work for
employers who pay at least some of the employer-sponsored health insurance premium (see Panel A of
Table 10). After controlling for observables including detailed occupation and before dropping universally
licensed occupations, licensed workers were more likely than unlicensed and uncertified workers to receive
employer-sponsored health insurance offers (see Panel B of Table 12). Estimates are available upon request.
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error in measuring licensing status in universally licensed occupations does
exist, we drop person-months with a reported occupation in which all practi-
tioners must obtain a license in an effort to identify the wage effect of a cre-
dential based on only wage variation within certified or partially licensed 3-
digit occupations (e.g., accountants and auditors).27 We then re-estimate the
model specification from column (4) on this reduced sample and present the
results in column (5). Dropping individuals in universally licensed occupations
results in an estimated 5.7 percent (standard error 1.0 percent) licensing wage
premium, which is not statistically different from the estimated effect when
TABLE 4
EFFECT OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION ON WAGESa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Definition 2:
Licensedb 0.240*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.062*** 0.048***
(0.011)c (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Certified 0.229*** 0.100*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.075***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
R2 0.033 0.340 0.441 0.514 0.509
N 77,059 75,562 75,374 75,374 66,786
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of a reference
month with implied hourly wages on the main job between $5 and $100. Regressions exclude person-month observations
with imputed implied hourly wage, licensure status, and union status. Regressions in columns (3), (4), and (5) also
exclude observations with imputed occupation. Regression in column (5) also excludes observations for which all practi-
tioners in the reported occupation must attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the full list of universally licensed
occupations. The reference period is May through November 2012.
bThe estimates in this table result from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is hourly wage on the main job as implied
by monthly earnings and profits, weeks worked at the main job in that month, and usual weekly hours worked on the
main job. We determine the main job in a particular month as the primary source of earnings in that month. Other con-
trols in columns (2)–(5) include a quadratic in age, years of education, union status, a government worker indicator, a
service worker indicator, a self-employed indicator, a female indicator, a Hispanic indicator, a black indicator, an Asian
indicator, and region fixed effects. Union status, government worker, service worker, self-employed worker, and occupa-
tion represent characteristics of workers’ main job or business. Column (3) uses 2-digit occupational affiliation and col-
umn (4) and (5) use 3-digit occupational affiliation according to the 2000 Census occupational classification system.
cWe employed 160 balanced repeated replicate weights using a Fay’s adjustment factor of 0.5 to estimate the standard
errors listed in parentheses. Standard errors take into account multiple observations at person level.
27 This list of universally licensed occupations was drawn from Summers (2007) and the CareerOneStop
website (http://www.careeronestop.org). We verified that all practitioners in these occupations must obtain a
license using the Occupational Outlook Handbook (http://www.bls.gov/ooh/). We report this list of univer-
sally licensed occupations in Appendix Table 3.
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these individuals are included. Given the benefits of the sample selection crite-
ria, the specification in column (5) better identifies our effect of interest.28
Our inability to distinguish confidently between licensed and certified workers
according to Definition 1 implies that the estimated wage premium in Panel A of
Table 3 is a weighted average of the gains accruing to licensed and certified
workers. Kleiner and Krueger (2013) failed to reject the hypothesis of no certifi-
cation wage premium, although they do show evidence that workers with a
license earn a wage premium. These conclusions suggest that the wage premium
according to Definition 1 underestimates the wage effect of a license. This might
explain why our estimate falls below the consensus range of licensing wage pre-
mia between 10 percent and 15 percent (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). In Panel B
of Table 3, we utilize the source of a worker’s credential to distinguish between
licensed and certified workers. Column (5) implies that, according to Definition
2, licensed workers earn approximately 3.8 percent higher wages on average rel-
ative to workers who have no credential and workers who have a certification.
Table 4 summarizes the results of regressions that include indicators for
licensed and certified workers according to Definition 2. Column (5) notes that
after controlling for observable heterogeneity including detailed occupation
and dropping universally licensed occupations, licensed workers earn approxi-
mately 4.8 percent (standard error 1.1 percent) higher wages on average than
unlicensed and uncertified workers. Certified workers earn approximately 7.5
percent (standard error 1.4 percent) higher wages on average than unlicensed
and uncertified workers. One potential reason why these results differ from
those in Kleiner and Krueger (2013) is that the SIPP yields relatively precise
estimates of certification wage effects, owing to its large sample size.
Over the period 2000 through 2009, using data from the American Commu-
nity Survey, licensing for massage therapists has a somewhat larger and a gen-
erally more prevalent statistically significant influence on earnings than does
certification for this occupation (Thornton and Timmons 2013). However, for
nurses, the wage effects for licensing are similar to our findings (Law and
Marks 2017). Occupations, such as interior designers and massage therapists,
28 To assess the impact of various biases from measurement error, we perform a number of additional
sensitivity exercises. We reran the model of column (4), restricting the sample to universally licensed occu-
pations, not only for wages but for three other dependent variables as well. The coefficient on licensing is
significantly positive in half the cases, a result that may be attributable to occupation mismeasurement or to
correct reporting being correlated with certain unobservables with returns in the labor market. We also reran
the same four models, this time using both definitions of licensing and restricting the sample to the 128
three-digit occupations that are not required to have a license in any state. These occupations account for
about 14 percent of the regression sample from column (4) of Table 3 (10,322 out of 75,374 person-month
observations). Of these observations, some 7.5 percent (unweighted) come from individuals who are charac-
terized as licensed according to Definition 2. The results are not significant in six out of eight cases, and
when significant, the coefficients are negative.
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are licensed in some states and certified in the others. We, however, cannot
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on the indicators for licensed
and certified workers are equal. These estimates should differ only because
licenses are required for entry into an occupation, whereas certifications are
not. To the extent that we accurately classify workers’ licensure and certifica-
tion status, this finding suggests that the signal that a credential sends might
influence wages more than the labor-supply restrictions that licensing policies
impose. Nonetheless, as noted, the presence of measurement error in the
source of the credentials, and thus in correct classification as licenses or certifi-
cations, necessitates caution about making definitive statements about the rela-
tive returns to credential type.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 decompose the wage effects of professional licenses and
certifications. In particular, Table 5 analyzes how the wage gain varies with
TABLE 5
EFFECT OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION GOVERNMENTAL JURISDICTION ON WAGESa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Federal governmentb 0.287*** 0.144*** 0.114*** 0.089*** 0.114***
(0.031)c (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030)
State government 0.244*** 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.061*** 0.040***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Local government 0.040 –0.033 0.046 0.036 0.060*
(0.048) (0.040) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036)
Private 0.229*** 0.100*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.075***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
R2 0.034 0.340 0.441 0.514 0.509
N 77,059 75,562 75,374 75,374 66,786
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of a reference
month with implied hourly wages on the main job between $5 and $100. Regressions exclude person-month observations
with imputed implied hourly wage, credential status, source of credential, and union status. Regressions in columns (3),
(4), and (5) also exclude observations with imputed occupation. Regression in column (5) also excludes observations for
which all practitioners in the reported occupation must attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the full list of univer-
sally licensed occupations. The reference period is May through November 2012.
bThe estimates in this table result from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is hourly wage on the main job as implied
by monthly earnings and profits, weeks worked at the main job in that month, and usual weekly hours worked on the
main job. We determine the main job in a particular month as the primary source of earnings in that month. Other con-
trols in columns (2)–(5) include a quadratic in age, years of education, union status, a government worker indicator, a
service worker indicator, a self-employed indicator, a female indicator, a Hispanic indicator, a black indicator, an Asian
indicator, and region fixed effects. Union status, government worker, service worker, self-employed worker, and occupa-
tion represent characteristics of workers’ main job or business. Column (3) uses 2-digit occupational affiliation and col-
umns (4) and (5) use 3-digit occupational affiliation according to the 2000 Census occupational classification system.
cWe employed 160 balanced repeated replicate weights using a Fay’s adjustment factor of 0.5 to estimate the standard
errors listed in parentheses. Standard errors take into account multiple observations at person level.
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the level of the jurisdiction that issues the credential. We restrict the estimation
sample to individuals who provided valid data about the source of their cre-
dential. Respondents selected only one issuing body, so we cannot determine
how levels of jurisdiction interact to have an impact on wages.29 Occupations
such as cab drivers, ride-sharing operators, and tour guides are most often
licensed at the city or county level rather than at the state level. In contrast,
commercial pilots and stockbrokers are licensed at the federal level. There is
TABLE 7
EFFECTS OF REQUIRED LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION ON WAGESa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Definition 1
Licensed or certified 0.151*** 0.016 0.012 0.017 0.013
(0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Licensed or certified 9
Required
0.109*** 0.083*** 0.088*** 0.068*** 0.066***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
R2 0.035 0.341 0.442 0.515 0.509
N 77,190 75,689 75,501 75,501 66,884
Panel B: Definition 2
Licensed 0.114*** 0.024 0.010 0.002 0.006
(0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Licensed 9 Required 0.152*** 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.084*** 0.075***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Certified 0.205*** 0.070*** 0.044** 0.045** 0.040**
(0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Certified 9 Required 0.039 0.049* 0.054* 0.049* 0.060**
(0.034) (0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
R2 0.035 0.341 0.443 0.515 0.509
N 76,994 75,497 75,309 75,309 66,725
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of a reference
month with implied hourly wages on the main job between $5 and $100. Regressions exclude person-month observations
with imputed implied hourly wage, licensure status, credential requirement, and union status. Regressions in columns (3),
(4), and (5) also exclude observations with imputed occupation. Regression in column (5) also excludes observations for
which all practitioners in the reported occupation must attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the full list of univer-
sally licensed occupations. The reference period is May through November 2012.
29 By contrast, the PDII allowed respondents to select all relevant levels of jurisdiction. Kleiner and
Krueger (2013) showed how each type of jurisdictional interaction affects wages. They concluded that, after
controlling for observable heterogeneity including detailed occupation, only state-issued credentials have any
wage effect in isolation. They estimated significant wage premia associated with credentials that were issued
by both the state and federal government and credentials that were issued by both the state and local govern-
ment.
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some evidence of measurement error when respondents answer which level of
government issues their credential, but it is difficult to assess how much and
the source. For instance, if a respondent says the federal government issued a
credential but s/he is in an occupation for which that level of government does
not issue a license, it is possible the respondent is answering this question
incorrectly, but it is also possible that s/he is referring to a credential uncon-
nected to the present occupation or that occupation has been miscoded.
With that caveat in mind, Table 5 reports evidence that credentials issued
by federal and state governments and private organizations are associated with
higher wages on average, regardless of whether we control for observable
heterogeneity. Estimates in column (5) control for detailed occupational affilia-
tion and exclude universally licensed occupations. Relative to workers with no
credential, workers with a federally issued credential earn 11.4 percent (stan-
dard error 3.0 percent) higher wages, workers with a state-issued credential
earn 4.0 percent (standard error 1.2 percent) higher wages, and workers with a
privately issued credential earn 7.5 percent (standard error 1.4 percent) higher
wages on average. Similarly, workers with a locally issued credential earn 6.0
percent (standard error 3.6 percent) higher wages relative to workers with no
credential, although these credentials do not appear to yield a wage premium
when we include universally licensed occupations. Thus, we join Kleiner and
Krueger (2013) in concluding that federally issued and state-issued credentials
exert a significant influence on wages. However, our data also reveal that cre-
dentials issued by private organizations and local governments are associated
with a comparable wage premium relative to federally issued credentials and
state-issued credentials. This underscores an advantage of the SIPP topical
module relative to the PDII, as that survey did not request information about
privately issued credentials.
With a couple of exceptions, once we include occupation fixed effects in
the regressions, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients by
source of credential. The results stem not only from the general closeness of
the coefficients, but also from the fact that the federal and local coefficients
are estimated imprecisely owing to the small number with such credentials
and, presumably, from measurement error.
Table 6 investigates how various requirements to attain a credential have an
impact on wages. We restrict the estimation sample to individuals who pro-
vided valid data about these requirements. Column (6) of Panel A shows that
after controlling for observable heterogeneity including detailed occupation
and omitting universally licensed occupations, workers who take courses or
training to achieve the credential earn 5.3 percent (standard error 2.6 percent)
higher wages on average. Similarly, workers who take periodic exams or con-
tinuing education classes to maintain the credential earn 6.5 percent (standard
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error 1.6 percent) higher wages on average. Panel B reports that these require-
ments are also associated with a wage premium when we classify licensed
workers according to Definition 2. Workers who demonstrate skills on the job
or pass an exam to obtain their credentials do not seem to earn higher wages
on average. We reject the hypothesis that none of these three licensing require-
ments helps determine wages. Moreover, column (4) of Panel A suggests that
workers with a credential who do not need to meet any of these three require-
ments earn lower wages than workers with no credential. Columns (5) and (6)
of Panel B yield a corresponding inference when we classify licensed workers
according to Definition 2. Kleiner and Krueger (2013) found no evidence of
higher wages among workers who must meet these requirements to attain their
licenses. They failed to reject the hypothesis that no licensing requirement
helps determine wages in models that control for observable heterogeneity.
The contrast in our inferences relative to those of Kleiner and Krueger (2013)
might stem from the relative precision with which we estimate the wage
effects of licensing requirements.
One concern with the results in Tables 3 and 4 is that, in some cases, indi-
viduals may have earned credentials and subsequently changed careers. To the
extent that the credentials are irrelevant in the present occupation, the estimates
in Tables 3 and 4 will underestimate the wage effects of interest. We address
this concern in Table 7, by examining the relationship between wages and
whether or not a respondent indicated that a license was required for the cur-
rent job. Although we do not know if respondents are interpreting this as a
legal requirement, the exercise is the closest to an analysis in Kleiner and
Krueger (2013). The results in Table 7 suggest that having a license when it is
not required has no influence on wage determination, but, when it is required,
licensing raises wages by 7.5 percent. This may be a measure of the potential
monopoly estimates of the requirement. This wage premium is larger than the
one associated with a certification requirement, which was 6.0 percent,
although the difference is not statistically significant. These results resemble
the estimates found by Kleiner and Krueger (2013), who suggested that having
an occupational license that is required to work results in a substantial wage
premium.30
Some policymakers and policy analysts claim that licenses and certifications
are particularly important for individuals with lower levels of traditional educa-
tional attainment. For example, a credential might signal high quality espe-
cially effectively in labor market segments in which potential service providers
30 The questions asked in the Westat survey were “Do you have a license or certification that is required
by a federal, state or local government agency to do your job?” and “Would someone who does not have a
license or certificate be legally allowed to do your job?”
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have lower than average levels of traditional educational attainment. To evalu-
ate this hypothesis, Table 8 allows for heterogeneous licensing wage effects
by quartile in the distribution of average education levels by occupation.31 We
TABLE 8
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION ON WAGESa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Definition 1
Credentialed 9 1st
(bottom) quartileb
0.049** 0.085*** 0.037* 0.053** 0.042*
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
Credentialed 9 2nd quartile 0.075*** 0.086*** 0.007 0.060*** 0.062***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Credentialed 9 3rd quartile 0.231*** 0.135*** 0.069*** 0.059*** 0.053***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Credentialed 9 4th (top)
quartile
0.495*** 0.219*** 0.165*** 0.082*** 0.064***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
R2 0.080 0.353 0.443 0.514 0.509
N 77,294 75,793 75,605 75,605 66,984
Panel B: Definition 2
Licensed 9 1st (bottom)
quartile
0.099*** 0.131*** 0.003 0.005 0.011
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028)
Licensed 9 2nd quartile 0.116*** 0.107*** 0.001 0.056*** 0.058***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Licensed 9 3rd quartile 0.186*** 0.103*** 0.049*** 0.030* 0.018
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Licensed 9 4th (top)
quartile
0.462*** 0.185*** 0.154*** 0.081*** 0.060**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024)
R2 0.057 0.347 0.442 0.513 0.508
N 77,059 75,562 75,374 75,374 66,786
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of a reference
month with implied hourly wages on the main job between $5 and $100. Regressions exclude person-month observations
with imputed implied hourly wage, licensure status, union status, and occupation. Regression in column (5) also excludes
observations for which all practitioners in the reported occupation must attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the
full list of universally licensed occupations. The reference period is May through November 2012.
bThe estimates in this table result from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is hourly wage on the main job as implied
by monthly earnings and profits, weeks worked at the main job in that month, and usual weekly hours worked on the
main job. We determine the main job in a particular month as the primary source of earnings in that month. Quartiles
reflect position in the distribution of average education levels by 3-digit occupational affiliation according to the 2000
Census occupational classification system. Quartile cutoffs for this distribution are 12.74, 13.68, and 15.07 years of edu-
cation.
31 To our knowledge, no existing study has allowed explicitly for heterogeneous licensing wage effects
by occupation. Credentials by own education do appear to have heterogeneous wage effects (Ewert 2014).
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restrict the estimation sample to individuals who provided valid occupation
data. Column (5) of Panel A reveals that credentialed workers in each quartile
of the distribution of average education levels by occupation earn more on
average relative to workers with no credential.32 We cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that the coefficient estimates for each quartile are equal. On the other hand,
Column (5) of Panel B reports that according to Definition 2, licensed workers
in the second and fourth quartiles earn, respectively, 5.8 percent and 6.0 per-
cent more than unlicensed workers. In testing for the presence of heteroge-
neous effects, we reject the hypotheses that the coefficients on the fourth and
first quartiles are equal and that the coefficients on the second and first quar-
tiles are equal.
Nonwage benefits from Wave 13 Core data. While the literature has con-
centrated on labor-market returns to licensing in the form of higher wages, it
is also possible that other aspects of compensation could be affected. We next
exploit SIPP data on nonwage benefits in order to determine whether licenses
and certifications confer gains along these dimensions as well. In this section,
we discuss the results of analyses for the reference period of May through
November 2012 using Wave 13 Core data. These analyses assume that a
worker’s licensure and certification status remained unchanged over the refer-
ence period.
Does having credentials make it more likely that an individual is employed?
Such a situation could come about if those with credentials have higher levels
of human capital and if credentials serve as a signal of quality, but also, partic-
ularly in the case of licensing, if they serve as a barrier to entry into occupa-
tions. Table 9 presents the estimated coefficients and marginal effects of a
probit regression that explains monthly employment status as a function of
person-level and job-level observables. We restrict the estimation sample to
respondents aged 18 through 64 who worked in the civilian labor force in
Wave 13 and those who did not work in Wave 13 but were on layoff, looked
for work, or were unable to find work. Estimation sample members who did
not work in Wave 13 worked in at least one previous wave of the 2008 SIPP
panel. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 for individuals who were
employed during a particular reference month and 0 for all other individuals.
Although existing studies have examined the relationship between licensing
and employment at the macroeconomic level (Adams, Jackson, and Ekelund
2002), we are aware of no examinations of this relationship at the microeco-
nomic level. Panel A reports that individuals with a credential are 1.4 percent
32 Sample weights were used to calculate average education levels by occupation. The quartile cutoffs
for this distribution are located at 12.74, 13.68, and 15.07 years of education.
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more likely on average to be employed in a particular month, controlling for
observable characteristics of the current or most recent job including detailed
occupation and excluding universally licensed occupations. Panel B decom-
poses this result by licensure and certification status according to Definition 2.
Only licensed individuals have a significantly higher likelihood of employment
on average than individuals with no credential. We reject the hypothesis that
the coefficient estimates on the indicators for licensed and certified workers
are equal.
TABLE 9
EFFECT OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF EMPLOYMENTa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Definition 1
Licensed or certifiedb 0.331*** 0.244*** 0.231*** 0.234*** 0.218***
(0.044) (0.049) (0.054) (0.058) (0.063)
[0.024]c [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014]
N 102,948 101,046 99,784 83,046 72,640
Panel B: Definition 2
Licensed 0.372*** 0.303*** 0.291*** 0.303*** 0.318***
(0.054) (0.062) (0.068) (0.071) (0.075)
[0.027] [0.017] [0.016] [0.018] [0.021]
Certified 0.258*** 0.163** 0.155* 0.160* 0.117
(0.067) (0.080) (0.082) (0.090) (0.095)
[0.019] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.008]
N 102,552 100,650 99,392 82,750 72,401
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who worked in Wave 13 and those who did not work in Wave 13 but were
on layoff, looked for work, or were unable to find work. Sample members who did not work in Wave 13 worked in at
least one previous wave of the 2008 SIPP panel. Regressions exclude person-month observations with imputed licensure
status and employment status. Regressions in columns (3), (4), and (5) also exclude observations with imputed occupa-
tion. Regression in column (5) also excludes observations for which all practitioners in the reported occupation must
attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the full list of universally licensed occupations. Regressions also exclude indi-
viduals who were contingent workers on their main job and individuals who responded that their usual number of hours
worked varied on the main job. The reference period is May through November 2012.
bThe estimates in this table result from probit regressions. The dependent variable takes value 1 for employed person-month
observations and 0 for unemployed observations and not-in-the-labor-force observations according to the CPS definitions.
Other controls in columns (2)–(5) include a quadratic in age, years of education, a female indicator, a Hispanic indicator,
a black indicator, an Asian indicator, region fixed effects, a married indicator, a disabled indicator, a school enrollment
indicator, an indicator for any own children in the household, number of own children in the household, number of own
children in the household under age 18, union status, a government worker indicator, a service worker indicator, a self-
employed indicator, establishment size effects, and a full-time worker indicator. Union status, government worker, service
worker, self-employed worker, establishment size, full-time worker, and occupation represent characteristics of workers’
main job or business. For respondents who did not work any month in the reference period, these variables represent
characteristics of the most recent job or business.
cWe present marginal effects in brackets.
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Finally, we investigate in Table 10 whether licensed or certified workers
benefit from a greater likelihood of having their employer pay for some or all
of their employer-provided health insurance premiums. We restrict the sample
to respondents who were employed at the end of any reference month. Among
the set of civilian workers aged 18 through 64 who had health insurance cov-
erage through their employer, our dependent variable indicates whether this
employer paid for at least some of the health insurance premium.33 Panel A
reveals that workers with a credential are no more likely on average to receive
contributions toward premiums after controlling for observable heterogeneity
and excluding universally licensing occupations. Panel B decomposes this
result by licensure and certification status according to Definition 2. Licensed
workers are no more likely to receive health insurance premium contributions
relative to workers without a credential. Certified workers are actually less
likely to receive such contributions after controlling for observable heterogene-
ity including detailed occupation. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the
coefficient estimates on the indicators for licensed and certified workers are
equal.
Nonwage benefits from previous topical modules. We now link the Profes-
sional Certifications, Licenses, and Educational Certificates topical module to
previous topical modules in order to expand the set of nonwage benefits and
broaden our estimation sample. Recall that we restrict the sample to individuals
whose main occupational spell in Wave 13 was ongoing in the relevant previ-
ous wave.34 We then assume that a respondent’s observed licensure or certifica-
tion status in Wave 13 matched the unmeasured, corresponding status in that
previous wave. Regressions include demographics and the characteristics of
jobs or businesses using Core SIPP data from that previous wave. Our examina-
tion of the Retirement and Pension Plan Coverage topical module and the
33 Given that respondents indicated whether their employers paid all, some, or none of the premium, it
may seem natural to treat this as an ordered outcome measuring the generosity of employer-provided health
insurance plans. Generosity may be measured by the amount of the employer’s contribution to health insur-
ance premiums, and this is the product of the share of the premium paid times the premium itself. If an
employer is more likely to pay the entire premium for low-cost plans, that employer’s contribution might be
smaller than the contribution of an employer that pays only some of the premium for a costlier plan. Since
SIPP does not offer information on employer contributions to health insurance plans, we cannot determine
confidently whether employers that pay the entire premium are more generous than employers that pay only
some of the premium. Instead, we assume that employers that pay at least some of the health insurance pre-
mium are more generous than employers that pay none of the premium.
34 Restricting the estimation sample to individuals who had the same occupation on the main job or
business in Wave 13 and Wave 11 reduces the sample size from 39,822 to 17,963. Restricting the estimation
sample to individuals whose main occupational spell in Wave 13 was ongoing in Wave 6 reduces the sam-
ple size from 53,849 to 13,577.
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Employer-Provided Health Benefits topical module assumes a reference period
of January through April 2012 and May through August 2010, respectively.
Table 11 details results from the Retirement and Pension Plan Coverage
topical module from Wave 11 of the SIPP. Among the set of individuals aged
18 through 64 who were employed in the same civilian occupation on the
main job or business in Wave 13 as in Wave 11, the dependent variable indi-
cates whether respondents received a retirement or pension plan offer. Panel A
documents that workers with a professional license or certification are 10.7
percent more likely to receive retirement and pension plan offers on average.
Workers with these credentials are 2.3 percent more likely to receive such
TABLE 10
EFFECT OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EMPLOYER MAKING A
CONTRIBUTION TOWARD HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMSa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Definition 1
Licensed or certifiedb 0.047 0.077 0.047 0.110* 0.086
(0.054) (0.058) (0.061) (0.064) (0.069)
[0.003]c [0.005] [0.003] [0.009] [0.007]
N 13,368 13,342 12,770 9,803 8,227
Panel B: Definition 2
Licensed 0.032 0.059 0.014 0.077 0.032
(0.058) (0.060) (0.064) (0.070) (0.083)
[0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.006] [0.003]
Certified 0.089 0.126 0.115 0.183* 0.179*
(0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.094) (0.104)
[0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.014] [0.014]
N 13,324 13,298 12,729 9,769 8,201
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of at least one
reference month and who had employer-sponsored health insurance. Regressions exclude person observations with
imputed licensure status and health insurance premium information. Regressions in columns (3), (4), and (5) also exclude
observations with imputed occupation. Regression in column (5) also excludes observations for which all practitioners in
the reported occupation must attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the full list of occupations licensed in all states.
Regressions also exclude individuals who were contingent workers on their main job and individuals who responded that
their usual number of hours worked varied on the main job. The reference period is May through November 2012.
bThe estimates in this table result from probit regressions. The dependent variable takes value 1 if a respondent’s employer
paid all or part of the health insurance premium and 0 for all other respondents with employer-provided health coverage.
We determine the main job in a particular month as the primary source of earnings in that month. Other controls in col-
umns (2)–(5) include a quadratic in age, years of education, a female indicator, a Hispanic indicator, a black indicator,
an Asian indicator, region fixed effects, a married indicator, union status, self-employed status, establishment size effects,
a full-time worker indicator, an indicator for any own children in the household, number of own children in the house-
hold, and number of own children in the household under age 18.
cWe present marginal effects in brackets.
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offers on average after we control for observable heterogeneity including
detailed occupation and exclude universally licensed occupations. Panel B of
Table 11 decomposes this estimate by licensure and certification status accord-
ing to Definition 2. Only certified workers are statistically significantly more
likely to receive retirement or pension plan offers than workers without a cre-
dential. Similarly, Gittleman and Kleiner (2016) find no evidence that workers
TABLE 11
EFFECT OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED RETIREMENT
AND PENSION PLAN OFFERSa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Definition 1
Licensed or certifiedb 0.278*** 0.078*** 0.106*** 0.129*** 0.087**
(0.022) (0.028) (0.032) (0.036) (0.037)
[0.107]c [0.022] [0.030] [0.034] [0.023]
N 17,963 16,738 16,657 16,302 14,237
Panel B: Definition 2
Licensed 0.285*** 0.072** 0.101*** 0.121*** 0.053
(0.024) (0.031) (0.037) (0.043) (0.047)
[0.110] [0.021] [0.028] [0.032] [0.014]
Certified 0.255*** 0.097** 0.120** 0.146*** 0.155***
(0.042) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.054)
[0.098] [0.028] [0.033] [0.039] [0.041]
N 17,906 16,686 16,607 16,255 14,192
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 11 Core and
Topical Module and Wave 13 Core and Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force at the end of the reference per-
iod and who worked in the same occupation on the main job in Waves 11 and 13. We determine the main job in a par-
ticular month of Wave 13 as the primary source of earnings in that month. SIPP determines the main job in the Wave
11 topical module according to the following algorithm. For respondents who held multiple jobs at the end of the 4-
month reference period, the main job is the one on which the respondent worked the most weeks during the reference
period. The topical module designates the main business using the same criterion for respondents who owned multiple
businesses at the end of the reference period. If a respondent worked an equal number of weeks at two or more jobs, the
main job is the one on which the respondent usually worked the most hours. If a respondent worked an equal number of
weeks at two or more businesses, the main business is the one on which the respondent earned the most during the refer-
ence period. If a respondent held a job and owned a business at the end of the reference period, the topical module asks
about retirement plans associated with the largest earnings source during the 4-month reference period. Regressions
exclude person observations with imputed licensure status and retirement and pension plan offers. Regressions in col-
umns (3), (4), and (5) also exclude observations with imputed occupation. Regression in column (5) also excludes obser-
vations for which all practitioners in the reported occupation must attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the full list
of universally licensed occupations. Regressions also exclude individuals who were contingent workers on their main job
in Wave 11 and individuals who responded that their usual number of hours worked varied on the main job in Wave 11.
The reference period is January through April 2012.
bOther controls in columns (2)–(5) include a quadratic in age, years of education, a female indicator, a Hispanic indicator,
a black indicator, an Asian indicator, region fixed effects, a married indicator, union status, self-employed status, estab-
lishment size effects, a full-time worker indicator, an indicator for any own children in the household, number of own
children in the household, and number of own children in the household under age 18.
cWe present marginal effects in brackets.
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who are covered by a licensing law have better access to retirement or pension
plans. Nevertheless, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient esti-
mates on the indicators for licensed and certified workers are equal.
Table 12 contains evidence from the Employer-Provided Health Benefits
topical module to Wave 6 of the SIPP on whether some of the returns to cre-
dentials are received in the form of better nonwage benefits. Among the set of
individuals aged 18 through 64 whose main civilian occupational spell in
Wave 13 was ongoing in Wave 6, the dependent variable indicates whether
respondents received an employer-provided health insurance offer. Recall that
Core SIPP data include information on such offers only for respondents who
had no health insurance coverage. Utilizing a previous topical module more
than doubles the sample size. This revised estimation sample yields different
inferences about the impact of credentials on employer-provided health insur-
ance offers.35 Panel A of Table 12 notes that workers with a license or certifi-
cation are 5.1 percent more likely to receive employer-provided health
insurance offers on average. This advantage is 2.7 percent after controlling for
observable heterogeneity including detailed occupation and excluding univer-
sally licensed occupations. Panel B of Table 12 analyzes how this effect varies
by licensure and certification status according to Definition 2. Both licensed
and certified workers appear more likely to receive these nonwage benefits
than workers without a credential. By contrast, Gittleman and Kleiner (2016)
found no evidence that workers who are covered by a licensing law have bet-
ter access to employer-provided health insurance plans. While it is possible
that our result stems from the fact that credentialed workers earn higher wages
and that higher-waged workers tend to be more likely to be offered health
insurance, when we include controls for wages (not shown here), our point
estimates change little and our results remain unchanged qualitatively. We can-
not reject the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates on the indicators for
licensed and certified workers are equal.
Our decision to restrict the sample to occupation stayers would bias the pre-
ceding estimates if workers with a license or certification were differentially
likely to change occupations in response to nonwage benefits. Two counter-
vailing tendencies might give rise to such behavior. First, to the extent that
nonwage benefits are distributed uniformly across workers in occupations, we
expect credentialed workers without these benefits to be less likely to change
occupations relative to uncredentialed workers without these benefits. Higher
average nonwage benefit offer rates suggest that credentialed workers would
35 When we use Core SIPP data only, we find no evidence that licensed or certified individuals are dif-
ferentially likely to receive employer-sponsored health insurance offers. Estimates are available upon
request.
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be more likely to gain access to these benefits by switching employers; switching
occupations might require abandoning the credential. Second, to the extent that
nonwage benefits are distributed disproportionately within occupations to work-
ers with high ability, we expect credentialed workers without these benefits to be
more likely to change occupations relative to uncredentialed workers without
these benefits. Higher average nonwage benefit offer rates suggest that creden-
tialed workers without nonwage benefits fall lower in the within-occupation dis-
tribution of ability relative to uncredentialed workers without these benefits.
TABLE 12
EFFECT OF LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED HEALTH
BENEFIT OFFERSa
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Definition 1
Licensed or certifiedb 0.163*** 0.042 0.108** 0.120** 0.138**
(0.031)c (0.043) (0.048) (0.050) (0.054)
[0.051]d [0.008] [0.021] [0.023] [0.027]
N 13,577 12,361 12,338 11,489 9,696
Panel B: Definition 2
Licensed 0.143*** 0.006 0.075 0.086 0.108*
(0.033) (0.044) (0.051) (0.055) (0.062)
[0.045] [0.001] [0.014] [0.016] [0.021]
Certified 0.206*** 0.130* 0.175** 0.185** 0.181**
(0.047) (0.068) (0.069) (0.073) (0.077)
[0.065] [0.026] [0.033] [0.035] [0.035]
N 13,525 12,315 12,292 11,446 9,661
Controls? N Y Y Y Y
Universally licensed? Y Y Y Y N
Occupation fixed effects? N N 2-digit 3-digit 3-digit
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 6 Core and
Topical Module and Wave 13 Core and Topical Module.
*denotes significant at the 10% confidence level, **denotes significant at the 5% confidence level, and ***denotes signifi-
cant at the 1% confidence level.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force at the end of the reference per-
iod and whose occupation in the main job in Wave 13 was also ongoing in Wave 6. We determine the main job in a par-
ticular month as the primary source of earnings in that month. Regressions exclude person observations with imputed
licensure status and health insurance offers. Regressions in columns (3), (4), and (5) also exclude observations with
imputed occupation. Regression in column (5) also excludes observations for which all practitioners in the reported occu-
pation must attain a license. See Appendix Table 3 for the full list of universally licensed occupations. Regressions also
exclude individuals who were contingent workers on their job in Wave 6 and individuals who responded that their usual
number of hours worked varied on the job in Wave 6. The reference period is May through August 2010.
bThe estimates in this table result from probit regressions. The dependent variable takes the value 1 for workers who
received employer-provided health insurance offers and 0 for workers who did not receive these offers. Other controls in
columns (2)–(5) include a quadratic in age, years of education, a female indicator, a Hispanic indicator, a black indicator,
an Asian indicator, region fixed effects, a married indicator, union status, self-employed status, establishment size effects,
a full-time worker indicator, an indicator for any own children in the household, number of own children in the house-
hold, and number of own children in the household under age 18. Union status, establishment size effects, full-time
worker, self-employed worker, and occupation represent characteristics of workers’ main job or business in Wave 6.
cWe employed 160 balanced repeated replicate weights using a Fay’s adjustment factor of 0.5 to estimate the standard
errors listed in parentheses. Standard errors take into account multiple observations at person level.
dWe present marginal effects in brackets.
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Workers who are relatively low or relatively high in the within-occupation distri-
bution of wages are more likely to change occupations than workers in the mid-
dle of this distribution (Groes, Kircher, and Manovskii 2015). This finding
suggests that among those with no nonwage benefits, credentialed workers are
more likely to change occupations than uncredentialed workers. Consequently,
the direction of any sample selection bias is ambiguous a priori.
Distributional effects. We have documented that professional licenses and
certifications are associated with significant wage and nonwage benefits on
average. We also consider whether these credentials affect workers differen-
tially across the wage distribution. To that end, our final exercise examines the
distributional effects of credentials, following Kleiner and Krueger (2013).
Tables 13 and 14 present the results when we classify workers’ licensure and
certification status according to Definition 1 and Definition 2, respectively. In
particular, we compute the predicted log wage and squared error for each per-
son-month observation. We then compare the conditional mean log wage and
mean squared error both overall and within quartiles of the predicted wage dis-
tribution resulting from a regression that omits licensure and certification sta-
tus.36 We refer to this distribution as the predicted uncredentialed wage
distribution in Table 13 and the predicted unlicensed wage distribution in
Table 14. As a benchmark, we report these findings in tandem with the results
of an analogous analysis of the distributional effects of unions.37
Panel B of Table 13 demonstrates that licensed or certified workers have
significantly larger conditional log wages overall than workers who do not
have these credentials. This trend is also evident within each quartile of the
predicted uncredentialed wage distribution. Note that licenses and certifications
are associated with the largest (smallest) conditional log wage gain for person-
36 While this thought experiment strongly resembles an analysis from Kleiner and Krueger (2013), our
approaches differ in one key respect. Specifically, we relax the assumption from Kleiner and Krueger (2013)
that the wage effect of a credential does not vary across the predicted wage distribution. If the wage effect
of a credential does not vary across the predicted wage distribution, then the difference in conditional mean
log wages by credential status varies across the predicted wage distribution only to the degree that the differ-
ence between credentialed and uncredentialed workers’ observables other than credential status vary across
this distribution. In this case, conditional mean log wage comparisons would serve as evidence for heteroge-
neous effects of credentials only if the requirements to attain a credential bind differentially across the pre-
dicted wage distribution. The conditional mean log wage comparisons in Tables 13 and 14 additionally
reflect any heterogeneous returns to a license across the predicted wage distribution. For ease of comparison
with Kleiner and Krueger (2013), we have also replicated Tables 13 and 14 assuming that the estimated
wage effect of a credential does not vary across the predicted wage distribution. Estimates are available upon
request.
37 One commonly noted effect of unions is to reduce wage dispersion (Card 1996; Freeman 1982). Free-
man and Medoff (1984) argued that unions view reducing wage variance as a stated objective. Neither pro-
fessional associations nor regulatory officials aim to explicitly reduce wage dispersion (Kleiner 2006).
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TABLE 13
DISTRIBUTIONAL WAGE EFFECTS OF LICENSING AND UNIONIZATION: DEFINITION 1a
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel Ab
Predicted Nonunion Wage Quartilee
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
Conditional mean ln(wage)d:
Nonunion 2.386 2.687 2.962 3.402 2.856
Union 2.621 2.942 3.195 3.417 3.078
Total 2.403 2.724 3.005 3.404 2.884
Union-non 0.236 0.256 0.233 0.014 0.222
p-valuef 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.000
Conditional mean squared error Ln(wage):
Nonunion 0.142 0.195 0.230 0.221 0.233
Union 0.181 0.157 0.150 0.165 0.178
Total 0.145 0.189 0.215 0.216 0.226
Union-non 0.039 0.038 0.079 0.056 0.054
p-value 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
Observations:
Nonunion 16,907 16,566 15,596 17,230 66,299
Union 1,370 2,739 3,484 1,713 9,306
Total 18,277 19,305 19,080 18,943 75,605
Panel Bc
Predicted Uncredentialed Wage Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
Conditional mean ln(wage):
Uncredentialed 2.372 2.687 2.981 3.387 2.818
Credentialed 2.524 2.800 3.095 3.431 3.054
Total 2.398 2.714 3.021 3.403 2.884
Credentialed-uncredentialed 0.153 0.113 0.114 0.045 0.237
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Conditional mean squared error Ln(wage):
Uncredentialed 0.136 0.194 0.220 0.208 0.221
Credentialed 0.169 0.211 0.219 0.207 0.237
Total 0.142 0.198 0.219 0.208 0.226
Credentialed-uncredentialed 0.033 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.016
p-value 0.001 0.181 0.901 0.945 0.012
Observations:
Uncredentialed 15,139 14,623 12,296 12,007 54,065
Credentialed 3,237 4,561 6,809 6,933 21,540
Total 18,376 19,184 19,105 18,940 75,605
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of a reference
month with implied hourly wages on the main job between $5 and $100. Regressions exclude person-month observations
with imputed implied hourly wage, licensure status, union status, and occupation. The reference period is May through
November 2012.
bPanel A presents the distributional impact of unions on both wages and wage dispersion. Columns (1) through (4) present
mean conditional log wages and mean squared errors within the first through fourth quartiles of the nonunion wage dis-
tribution. Column (5) presents these statistics for the entire sample.
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month observations in the bottom (top) quartile of the predicted uncredentialed
wage distribution. Panel B of Table 14 leads to the same qualitative infer-
ences. Panel A in Tables 13 and 14 illustrates that union members also appear
to have larger conditional mean log earnings than nonunion workers, both
overall and within each quartile of the predicted nonunion wage distribution
(Freeman and Kleiner 1990). Our conclusions generally corroborate the evi-
dence of Kleiner and Krueger (2013).
Panel B in Tables 13 and 14 reveals a more nuanced impact of credentials
on wage dispersion. Contrasting the mean squared error across workers with a
license or certification and workers without these credentials, Table 13 sug-
gests that these credentials increase wage dispersion overall. However, this
statistic obscures the differential impact of a credential on wage dispersion
across the predicted uncredentialed wage distribution. In particular, wage dis-
persion and credentials only appear to be related in the bottom quartile of this
distribution, where wage dispersion is higher among workers with a license or
certification. Table 14 documents the same qualitative effect of licensing on
wage dispersion when we classify workers’ licensure status according to Defi-
nition 2, except licensing seems not to have an impact on wage dispersion
overall. Panel A in Tables 13 and 14 yields the anticipated inference that
unions are associated with less wage dispersion both overall and at the top of
the predicted nonunion wage distribution. Kleiner and Krueger (2010, 2013)
found no evidence that licensing has an impact on wage dispersion, either
overall or in any quartile of the predicted unlicensed wage distribution.
Conclusions
Taking advantage of new data on the Professional Certifications, Licenses,
and Educational Certificates topical module in the thirteenth wave of the
2008 SIPP, we have examined a number of important labor market
cPanel B presents the distributional impact of licenses and certifications on both wages and wage dispersion. Columns (1)
through (4) present mean conditional log wages and mean squared errors within the first through fourth quartiles of the
uncredentialed wage distribution. Column (5) presents these statistics for the entire sample.
dConditional mean log wage and mean squared error of log wage result from averages of predicted values from an OLS
regression that controls for a quadratic in age, years of education, union status, licensure and certification status, a gov-
ernment worker indicator, a service worker indicator, a self-employed indicator, a female indicator, a Hispanic indicator,
a black indicator, an Asian indicator, and region fixed effects. In columns (1) through (4), coefficient estimates of this
OLS regression are assumed to vary across quartiles of the predicted nonunion and uncredentialed wage distributions.
Implied hourly wage, union status, government worker, service worker, self-employed worker, and occupation represent
characteristics of workers’ main job or business. We determine the main job in a particular month as the primary source
of earnings in that month.
eThe predicted nonunion wage quartile results from a regression that drops union status from the set of controls and adds
2-digit occupation fixed effects. The predicted uncredentialed wage quartile results from a regression that drops licensure
and certification status from the set of controls and adds 2-digit occupation fixed effects.
fWe employed 160 balanced repeated replicate weights using a Fay’s adjustment factor of 0.5 to estimate p-values. Stan-
dard errors take into account multiple observations at person level.
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TABLE 14
DISTRIBUTIONAL WAGE EFFECTS OF LICENSING AND UNIONIZATION: DEFINITION 2a
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel Ab
Predicted Nonunion Wage Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
Conditional mean ln(wage)d:
Nonunion 2.386 2.691 2.958 3.401 2.856
Union 2.626 2.937 3.192 3.428 3.078
Total 2.404 2.727 3.001 3.404 2.884
Union-non 0.241 0.246 0.234 0.026 0.222
p-valuef 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
Conditional mean squared error Ln(wage):
Nonunion 0.141 0.195 0.234 0.221 0.233
Union 0.174 0.162 0.150 0.161 0.179
Total 0.143 0.190 0.218 0.215 0.227
Union-non 0.033 0.033 0.084 0.059 0.054
p-value 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000
Observations:
Nonunion 16,902 16,452 15,540 17,210 66,104
Union 1352 2766 3481 1671 9270
Total 18,254 19,218 19,021 18,881 75,374
Panel Bc
Predicted Unlicensed Wage Quartilee
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total
Conditional mean ln(wage):
Unlicensed 2.379 2.701 2.994 3.395 2.840
Licensed 2.534 2.780 3.091 3.432 3.059
Total 2.398 2.714 3.019 3.405 2.884
Licensed-unlicensed 0.155 0.079 0.097 0.037 0.218
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Conditional mean squared error Ln(wage):
Unlicensed 0.137 0.198 0.224 0.209 0.225
Licensed 0.175 0.201 0.208 0.210 0.234
Total 0.141 0.198 0.220 0.209 0.227
Licensed-unlicensed 0.038 0.003 0.016 0.001 0.010
p-value 0.002 0.839 0.138 0.906 0.160
Observations:
Unlicensed 16,093 16,017 14,140 13,890 60,140
Licensed 2178 3119 4950 4987 15,234
Total 18,271 19,136 19,090 18,877 75,374
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of at least one
reference month with implied hourly wages on the main job between $5 and $100. Regressions exclude person-month
observations with imputed implied hourly wage, licensure status, union status, and occupation. The reference period is
May through November 2012.
bPanel A presents the distributional impact of unions on both wages and wage dispersion. Columns (1) through (4) present
mean conditional log wages and mean squared errors within the first through fourth quartiles of the nonunion wage dis-
tribution. Column (5) presents these statistics for the entire sample.
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outcomes to see whether they differ by licensing status. The use of the SIPP
offers a number of advantages over other datasets, including a direct mea-
sure of attainment, a large sample size, and a rich set of explanatory vari-
ables. The ability to link to previous topical modules has also enabled us to
extend the analysis beyond merely estimating a wage premium. Nonetheless,
the SIPP topical module does have an important limitation in that it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish between those who have a license and
those who have a certification. As a result, throughout our analysis we have
used two definitions for licensing status: one in which we try to distinguish
between license and certification holders and one in which we do not. The
results are broadly consistent across the two definitions. After controlling for
observable heterogeneity, including occupational status, those with a license
earn higher pay, are more likely to be employed, and have a higher proba-
bility of receiving employer-provided health insurance offers. In addition,
licensing does not appear to have much effect on reducing wage inequality
among various categories, but licensed workers in the bottom quartile seem
to gain relative to similar workers.
While the SIPP data enable us to say much about the direction and magni-
tude of the impact of credentials on various labor-market outcomes, unavoid-
ably, in part because of the difficulty in distinguishing between the licensed
and the certified, we have less to say about the mechanisms that lead to our
results. As a result, other researchers, using a variety of datasets and
approaches, have ample scope to continue trying to better understand this
important labor-market institution.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
MOST COMMON OCCUPATIONS FOR CREDENTIALED WORKERS: DEFINITION 1a
Rank Occupationb Nc
Percent Licensed
or Certified
1 Registered nurses 1854 85.7
2 Elementary and middle school teachers 1783 75.2
3 Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 845 56.1
4 Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 767 41.0
5 Secondary school teachers 719 77.6
6 Lawyers 598 77.2
7 Managers, all other 526 23.6
8 Hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists 437 89.4
9 Physicians and surgeons 421 81.4
10 Accountants and auditors 363 33.3
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of at least one
reference month. Summary statistics exclude imputed values. The reference period is May through November 2012. Defi-
nition 1 does not distinguish between workers who have a certification and workers who have a license.
bOccupations represent characteristics of workers’ main job or business. We determine the main job in a particular month
as the primary source of earnings in that month.
cMost common occupations have the largest number of person-month observations with a license or certification within the
occupation. These estimates are representative of SIPP data and not of the U.S. population in general.
APPENDIX TABLE 2
MOST COMMON OCCUPATIONS FOR CREDENTIALED WORKERS: DEFINITION 2a
Rank Occupationb Nc
Percent
Licensed Occupation N
Percent
Certified
1 Elementary and middle
school teachers
1683 71.1 Registered nurses 279 13.0
2 Registered nurses 1563 72.7 Managers, all other 226 10.1
3 Secondary school teachers 693 75.2 Driver/sales workers and truck
drivers
194 10.4
4 Nursing, psychiatric, and
home health aides
636 42.8 Nursing, psychiatric, and home
health aides
189 12.7
5 Driver/sales workers and
truck drivers
560 30.1 Automotive service technicians
and mechanics
141 22.8
6 Lawyers 491 63.7 Electricians 129 26.9
7 Hairdressers, hairstylists, and
cosmetologists
351 71.8 Retail salespersons 125 5.3
8 Physicians and surgeons 337 66.2 Computer scientists and
systems analysts
116 17.4
9 Managers, all other 300 13.4 Lawyers 103 13.4
10 Accountants and auditors 264 24.3 Insurance sales agents 100 24.0
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation from the 2008 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Wave 13 Core and
Topical Module.
aSample includes all respondents aged 18–64 who were employed in the civilian labor force as of the end of at least one reference
month. Summary statistics exclude imputed values. The reference period is May through November 2012. Definition 2 identi-
fies a worker as licensed if a governmental body issued the credential and certified if a private body issued the credential.
bOccupations represent characteristics of workers’ main job or business. We determine the main job in a particular month
as the primary source of earnings in that month.
cMost common occupations have the largest number of person-month observations with a license or certification within the
occupation. These estimates are representative of SIPP data and not of the U.S. population in general.
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APPENDIX TABLE 3
LIST OF UNIVERSALLY LICENSED OCCUPATIONS
• Architects, except naval (all jurisdictions but the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine,
and Massachusetts),
• Audiologists,
• Barbers,
• Bus drivers,
• Chiropractors,
• Dental hygienists,
• Dentists,
• Driver/sales workers and truck drivers,
• Emergency medical technicians and paramedics,
• Funeral directors (all jurisdictions but Colorado),
• Hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists,
• Insurance sales agents,
• Lawyers,
• Licensed practical and licensed vocational nurses,
• Occupational therapists,
• Optometrists,
• Pest control workers,
• Pharmacists,
• Physical therapists,
• Physician assistants,
• Physicians and surgeons,
• Podiatrists,
• Real estate brokers and sales agents,
• Registered nurses,
• Respiratory therapists (all jurisdictions but Alaska),
• Taxi drivers and chauffeurs,
• Teachers (all but private sector),
• Veterinarians, and
• Water and liquid waste treatment plant and system operators.
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